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The missing politics of urban vulnerability: 
The state and the co-production of climate risk  
Abstract 
Studies of urban disaster and climate change risk have increasingly invoked 
governmentality as a theoretical frame for understanding how urban risk 
governance functions. This article argues that the use of governmentality in this 
context can advance political readings of urban vulnerability to climate risk. 
However, using the idiom of co-production from Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), I question current treatments of the politics of expertise in the urban risk 
governance literature, highlighting the need to understand the political 
commitments and practices that shape the implementation of purportedly technical 
risk knowledge and their particular manifestation in the context of informal, urban 
settlements. A case study from Bogota, Colombia, links the science and practice of 
state risk management to vulnerability outcomes in informal urban settlements. It 
shows how a new suite of qualitative methodological approaches are revealing of 
the power-knowledge dynamics in governance that influence vulnerability, and 
their differential social effects.  
Keywords 
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Introduction  
Over the past decade, the imperative to adapt to the impacts of climate change has 
provoked new forms of intervention in cities which have variously overlain or 
bypassed older programmes for tackling disaster risks (Bulkeley and Tuts, 2013). 
The convergence and tensions between the adaptation and disaster risk policy 
domains is widely discussed, with the orientation of adaptation work focussed on a 
sub-set of climate-related risks diagnosed utilising global climate models in addition 
to historical climate data and probabilistic forecasts (Birkmann and Von Teichmann, 
2010). Despite different but overlapping foci, long-standing literature in both sub-
fields has stressed the common need for policy to address not only the onset of 
biophysical hazards and their impacts but also the underlying social vulnerabilities 
that give rise to risk, where risk then reflects the likelihood not only of a biophysical 
event but also of a human disaster causing losses in life, mortality or livelihood 
(Blaikie et al. 1994; Bulkeley and Tuts, 2013). This view of vulnerability as the “pre-
event, inherent characteristics or qualities of social systems that create the potential 
for harm” (Cutter et al., 2008 p.299) derives from the political ecology schools of 
hazards and disaster risk research, which challenged earlier frameworks in their 
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neglect of the political economy factors that made people vulnerable (Hewitt, 1983; 
Blaikie et al., 1994). In contrast to vulnerability frameworks focussing on the 
contemporary biophysical and social conditions of a given area (Cutter et al. 2008), 
structural theorists seek to elucidate the causal social, political, economic and 
institutional structures of entitlement that mediate peoples’ access to resources 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Adger, 2006). 
A large proportion of socially vulnerable urban groups live in informal urban 
settlements, or those constructed outside formal regulation, where the lack of rights 
and recognition precludes access to the formal infrastructure, services and markets 
which protect against climate-related risks (World Bank, 2011). Here, the nature of 
urban politics and governance is germane to the nature and dynamics of 
vulnerability (Satterthwaite, 2011; Moser et al., 2010). Our conceptual 
understanding of urban vulnerability in this context is challenged to account for 
both the structural entitlements under negotiation (as discussed in Pelling, 2003, 
although without explicit theorisation of informality) but also the role of informal 
institutional processes alongside the formal, and of power and meaning alongside 
material resources, emphasised through post-structural entitlements frameworks 
(Leach et al., 1997). Indeed, as increased efforts are made to tackle the impacts of 
climate change in urban areas, related critical social and political theory - and 
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particularly work indebted to governmentality frameworks – is finding growing 
application to investigate their framing, implementation and consequences 
(Stripple and Bulkeley, 2014).  
This article critically examines engagements with governmentality as a framework 
for understanding urban climate risk governance and its impacts on social 
vulnerability in conditions of informal settlement. As the following section argues, 
additional perspectives from Science and Technology Studies (STS) challenge 
existing scholarship to account for the political commitments embedded in ‘expert-
led’ risk assessments and the institutional practices through which technical risk 
knowledge is enacted, which in turn requires a better understanding of how the 
institutional dynamics of informal, urban settlements shape risk governance.   
The following sections then introduce the case study and methods, discussing how 
the use of oral history methods alongside surveying techniques can shed new light 
on the urban politics of risk and its differential effects on vulnerable populations. 
Empirical findings from Bogota, Colombia, demonstrate how risk knowledge is co-
produced with state practice to influence vulnerabilities. Finally, the conclusion 
discusses the implications for theory and practice.   
 
Understanding the politics of vulnerability in informal, urban settlements 
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Knowledge and power in urban risk governance 
Studies of urban disaster and climate change risk have increasingly highlighted that 
knowledge-power relationships shape urban risk governance (Mustafa, 2005). 
Invoking James Scott’s implicitly Foucauldian notion of ‘seeing like a state’, authors 
highlight how technocratic framings of risk simplify the social and political 
dynamics of everyday life, and are contested by lay understandings (Mustafa, 2005; 
Rebotier, 2012). Other work draws more explicitly on Foucault’s governmentality 
approach to show how risk is constituted as a new problematic for urban 
governance, creating new territories and subjects (Zeiderman, 2012; Boyd et al., 
2014). In line with work on the politics of knowledge in disaster risk reduction more 
generally, both seams of literature highlight how contests in risk governance reflect 
the broader nature of social relations and struggles over the prevailing social order 
(Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009). Harnessed to the analysis of social vulnerability, and 
its causal structures, the development of such conceptualisations of governance 
ensures power and politics remain at the forefront of analysis – phenomena which 
have too often been marginal to agent-based livelihoods approaches to urban 
vulnerability (Hendriks, 2011) – and emphasises the role played by particular 
techniques and practices of government (Bulkeley, 2015).  
The politics of science and the co-production of urban risk governance 
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While analysis of the ‘reasons’ of government is central to the project of 
governmentality analysis (Stripple and Bulkeley 2014), other work in the STS sub-
field of science-policy studies – drawn together under the idiom of ‘co-production’ – 
critically interrogates the political and social commitments that underpin the role 
and use of science in government (Jasanoff 2004). In the urban climate risk 
literature, discussion of the social and political influences on the ‘making of 
knowledge’ remain largely confined to discussion of the political uses of technical 
risk knowledge (Mustafa 2005; Zeiderman 2012; Boyd et al. 2014). However, 
questions arise about the politics lying within what is purportedly technical and not 
just in what is ‘cast out’ (a politics that Jasanoff argues has “tended to be leached 
away in most high-modern theorising about expertise” (Jasanoff, 2004: 279). While 
risk assessments, a cornerstone of many programmes of government improvement 
through risk reduction, may indeed be ‘rendered technical’ (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 
2007), a long-standing literature in STS has stressed how such risk assessments 
nevertheless embody social assumptions about agency, causality and responsibility 
(Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). The need to fix what may actually be uncertain or more 
indeterminate elements of risk – such as institutional behaviours – leads to highly 
contingent assumptions being ‘written in’ to technical exercises (Wynne,  1996; 
Lane, Landström, and Whatmore, 2011). Studies of risk-based policy-making 
indebted to the idea of co-production further show how the form and use of risk 
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classification and assessment tools serve the pre-existing, and possibly competing, 
political logics and interests of multiple stakeholders (Epstein, 2009; Rothstein and 
Downer, 2012). 
Co-production therefore provides a promising frame through which to understand 
the political rationalities of knowledge embedded in urban risk governance 
interventions, and their interplay with the practices of government (Jasanoff, 2004). 
The application of this frame to the specific context of urban informality – where the 
nature of state practice in response to disaster and climate change risks has received 
little focussed attention (Boyd et al. 2014) –  requires critical examination of how 
states govern in such areas.  
Re-thinking risk governance and its effects in informal, urban settlements 
The disaster risk and climate change adaptation planning literature in urban areas 
has thus far concentrated on the challenges to integrating necessary plans in the 
formal structures of local government, and the limits to existing policies (Wamsler 
and Brink, 2013, Birkman et al., 2010). It has only just begun to explore how such 
planning practices ‘play out’, particularly in informal, urban settlements. Where the 
urban ‘risk governmentality’ literature touches on informality it highlights how risk 
management creates subjects beyond the realm of formal regulation (Boyd et al., 
2014). However, urban planning theorists have noted that, far from always existing 
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‘beyond the state’, informal, urban areas have also been sites of formalisation and 
inclusion, and states are present in informal areas in heterogeneous ways (Varley, 
2013; Jenkins and Anderson, 2011). The state’s involvement in processes of defining 
and producing informal and formal settlement, and related categories of legal and 
illegal, relies on highly flexible practices of “exceptions, contradictions, ambiguity 
and arbitrary decision-making”, which underlie formal planning processes (Duminy, 
2011: 2). Further – contrary to the assumption that the modern state governs and 
plans only through technologies of visibility, counting, mapping and enumerating, 
as the ‘seeing like a state’ literature suggests – it is held that it is the process of 
deregulation and ‘un-mapping’ that allows the state to control land and its use in 
informal areas (Roy, 2009). A further analytic step – in line with the aim of co-
production to unpack both the ‘scientific’ and the ‘social’ together (Jasanoff 2004) – 
is to acknowledge that both the urban disaster and climate change risk governance 
and urban planning studies literatures maintain a conception of the state as a unified 
agent. State theorists have nevertheless noted that state elites, agencies and levels 
of government may themselves be at odds around a given agenda (Corbridge et al., 
2005; Gupta, 2012). Further, this conceptualisation of a ‘disunited’ state is central to 
understanding the processes through which state power produces mass poverty, 
even in sites of stated inclusion: the effectiveness of social welfare programmes, for 
example, is undermined by tensions between different levels of government (Gupta, 
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2012). This work emphasises the need to problematise the state and its purposive 
projects of risk management as well as understand the interaction between the 
‘state’ and multiple formal and informal local actors (Boyd et al., 2014).  
Case study and methods  
The conceptual discussion above raises central questions about how social 
vulnerabilities to climate-related risks are governed in informal, urban areas 
through institutional processes of defining, appropriating and using particular 
concepts and technicalities of risk that reflect the political logics and aspirations of 
relevant actors.  
To investigate these questions, the research used an in-depth case study of an urban 
landslide risk management programme – the ladera or hillslopes programme – with 
a long history of implementation in the informal settlements of Bogota, Colombia. In 
Bogota a globally renowned system of risk management has penetrated these areas 
since the 1990s, when the mayoral administrations of Mockus (1995-1997 and then 
2001-2004) and Peñalosa (1997-end 2000) developed such programmes as an 
integral part of urban improvement efforts, under Peñalosa catalysing physical 
investments in  neighbourhood legalisation, improvement and integrated urban 
spatial planning (Zeiderman, 2012; Robles Joya, 2008). Since then, dedicated cadres 
of engineers have produced some of the most detailed records of risk and 
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vulnerability in the world, on the basis of which the city government has defined 
risk zones and implemented resettlement programmes, structural mitigation works 
and education campaigns (Dickson et al., 2010). Although the ladera programme 
was originally conceived as a disaster risk programme, from 2012-2015 under the 
mayoral leadership of Gustavo Petro, such programmes were harnessed to the 
development of climate change adaptation policies in the city, giving further impetus 
to resettlement efforts (Lopez, pers. comm. 19 May 2016).  
Field research to investigate the relationship between hazard occurrence, the 
vulnerability of households and the practices and knowledge basis of government 
interventions over time took place in 2009-2010 in three government-designated 
landslide risk zones in Ciudad Bolivar, on the South Western periphery of the city: 
Altos de Estancia, Caracoli and Brisas de Volador. All the zones shared a history of 
informal settlement and were subject to the same formal strictures of the ladera 
programme. However, the three zones had distinct histories of state engagement 
and community responses, which allowed for a broader range of state and social 
practices to be observed and comparisons to be drawn which illuminated key 
drivers of vulnerability.    
“insert Fig. 1 here” 
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Fig. 1: Landslide risk map of Bogota showing the location of the Ciudad Bolivar 
neighbourhood 
Different shadings depict high, medium and low risk.  
Source: DPAE, Bogota 
Examining vulnerability as “a function of the exposure (who or what is at risk) and 
sensitivity of system (the degree to which people and places can be harmed)” 
(Cutter, 1996 p.559), research methods were selected with the aim of, first, probing 
the role of state knowledge, power, practice and meaning in shaping the nature and 
distribution of vulnerability in affected communities and, second, contextualising 
such findings with reference to the socio-economic and political statuses of 
households living in the risk zones to understand the differential effects of state 
practice. The central methods were a semi-structured household survey coupled 
with a more open and flexible mode of oral history. This focussed less on full life 
chronologies, and instead on an adapted ‘livelihood trajectories’ approach which 
sought to understand the pathways of different social groups over the course of the 
programme (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005). As for oral histories in general, these 
proved an invaluable method for exploring the interactions between structure and 
agency and uncovering narratives that challenged dominant policy discourse 
(Lewis, 2008). The ‘livelihood trajectories’ approach went beyond just mapping the 
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contours of behaviour, however, in its exploration of attitudes and beliefs, an explicit 
focus on power relations and a situating of individual behaviours in relation to 
broader social-cultural repertoires (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005).  The two methods 
of survey and oral history overlapped: more open histories initially ‘grounded’ the 
investigation, whilst in the later stages the systematic collection of household data 
through the semi-structured interviews (household origin, ownership, social 
structure, housing material, economic activities, levels of education and health 
status, access to services, social involvement) allowed new types of household to be 
identified for more in-depth interviews. For the analysis, salient social and economic 
groupings were compared and, to contextualise the rich, narrative information, case 
studies or household vignettes were used to report the findings, alongside the 
identification of common themes through the coding of interview texts. 
A random sampling technique for surveying in the zones proved difficult due to the 
on-going resettlement of communities, the mobility of households and communities 
themselves and security considerations which limited access to certain groups (such 
as households unavailable during daylight hours). I nevertheless conducted 96 
interviews, using community informants to ‘snowball’ out to different types of 
inhabitants according to their geographic spread in the risk zone, classified level of 
risk (high or medium), housing construction type, livelihoods status (newly 
displaced communities, for instance, as well as older community groups), and 
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political status (eligible or ineligible for resettlement, for example). To offset bias 
towards groups remaining in risk zones after resettlement, I interviewed in two 
resettlement sites as well as within the risk zones.  
“insert Fig. 2 here” 
Fig. 2: Surveying the Brisas de Volador risk zone  
1000 people were estimated to live in the zone. 29 interviews were undertaken in the 
high risk (upper) and medium risk (lower) sections, including original settlers (whose 
brick houses appear in the middle of the photo), newer settlers who had inhabited 
cleared plots (to the right of centre), displaced families in the upper section of the 
cleared area and a group of home owners to the upper right quadrant of the photo 
who were under threat of eviction. Interviews included 1 renter and 2 squatters.  
Source: Author 2010.  
The salient historical junctures and practices of the ladera programme identified in 
household interviews were further explored in in-depth interviews with community 
leaders and key informants, in field visits with government officials and in 33 semi-
structured interviews with current and former local government officials involved 
with the programme. This was complemented by analysis of official documents and 
media reports produced over the period of programme and of documents (such as 
legal transcripts and petition letters) made available by households and community 
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leaders. This suite of methods moves beyond conventional social vulnerability 
assessments in historicising and politicising the investigation of the drivers of 
vulnerability. However, it retains a structured understanding of the longitudinal 
evolution and spatial distribution of vulnerability in the sites, which might have 
been lost without the survey method.  
Findings and discussion  
The analysis that follows uses the framing idea of co-production to examine the 
relationship between science and government practice in risk management and its 
influence on patterns of household exposure and sensitivity to landside risk across 
three informally-settled sites over time. The first section examines the political 
assumptions embedded in the practice of risk assessments and their effects. The 
second and third sections explore the political logics at work in the process of 
categorising who is at risk in high-risk zones. The fourth section moves from a focus 
on the practices of risk management agencies to show how the objectives and 
practices of wider sets of state institutions converge and diverge in the process of 
governing risk in informal sites.    
Political assumptions in the assessment of landslide risk boundaries 
Bogota’s landslide risk management programme has exemplified a physically-based 
paradigm for assessing risk overlooking the structural and social causes, agency and 
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coping strategies and local perceptions and meanings of risk, in ways already 
discussed by vulnerability analysts (Blaikie et al., 1994; Forsyth, 2003). Landslide 
risk assessments are based on the likelihood of physical threat and the condition of 
the physical infrastructure (housing). These forms of expertise have buttressed 
state power to define risk in the face of conflicting local interpretations and 
behaviours, as post-structuralist theorists concerned with the knowledge apparatus 
of modern states highlight (Rebotier 2013; Mustafa 2005). While communicating 
risk according to risk assessments has been a major strategy of the programme, the 
aim has been to project the results of risk assessments, with no active involvement 
by those affected in the assessment process or the design of the programmes that 
follow1. 
However, beyond the exercise of power based on purportedly neutral ‘technical’ 
expertise, a more complex politics of knowledge also underpinned the way in which 
risk zones are defined that reflected assumptions about institutional behaviour and 
responsibility in the context of the formalisation of informal settlements, as science-
policy studies highlights (Lane, Landström, and Whatmore, 2011; Wynne, 1996). 
                                                          
1 Community meetings I attended became a forum for officials to explain district policy and procedure, and 
where participation has been formally encouraged it has mostly involved engaging communities remaining 
around the high risk zones to participate in schemes to monitor new settlement in the zones.  
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Across the three landslide risk zones, this took two forms. The first was the 
assumption made in grading areas ‘medium’ rather than ‘high’ risk that 
infrastructure upgrading would occur (given that risk assessment processes went 
hand in hand with the legalisation, formalisation and, ultimately, ‘securitisation’, of 
Bogota’s informal areas) which would restore the physical condition of the area. Any 
lack of upgrading, however, influenced the occurrence of landslide disasters in 
medium risk zones as deterioration due to the on-going lack of a legal water and 
drainage system, and subsequent water filtration, changed the conditions of the soil 
(Department for Emergency Prevention and Response (DPAE) official – July 2010). 
New landslide emergencies prompted boundary revisions and the expansion of 
medium risk zones into high risk zones (where inhabitants might then be included 
in resettlement programmes)2. In the risk zone of Caracoli, for example, both the 
first technical assessment of landslide risk in 1999-2000 and a subsequent 
evaluation in 2008 assumed infrastructure upgrading in areas then classified as 
‘medium’ risk. However, in the first instance, the state and community remained in 
                                                          
2 In the course of fieldwork in 2010 such emergencies were declared in Caracoli and in the north of the 
Altos de Estancia risk zone. In 2011 a landslide was reported in Brisas de Volador which affected houses 
in the medium as well as high risk part of the zone. In all cases, this expansion of the high risk zone led to 
new incorporations into the state resettlement scheme.   
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conflict about the legal right of people to remain in what was a state-designated 
forest conservation zone (Lopez, 2007; DPAE, 2006). By the time of the second 
technical assessment the settlement had been legally recognised and institutional 
upgrading was underway, but it was slow. 
The second assumption related to the designation of ‘mitigable’ and ‘non-mitigable’ 
levels of high risk, which affected whether inhabitants were to be resettled. 
Decisions in this respect reflected a pre-assigned political assumption that 
upgrading housing infrastructure (as opposed to providing large infrastructure 
works such as contention walls) was an action on private property where the 
responsibility rested with homeowners themselves. In the case of the Caracoli, for 
example, the Technical Assessment Report of 2006 made clear that “these actions 
[mitigation works] must be undertaken by owners of the lots, given that the DPAE 
[the disasters agency] does not have house improvement programmes and that it 
cannot intervene on private property” (DPAE, 2006: 54). However, fieldwork in all 
three high risk zones found that such actions (such as stabilising cuttings in the hill 
slopes for construction) were widely beyond the financial reach of most households. 
The absence of such actions exacerbated risk levels for people who were technically 
excluded from resettlement because the risks had been deemed as ‘mitigable’. 
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The categorisation of ‘at risk’ households and processes of exclusion 
While the risk assessment process described above for defining risk zones was also 
used to distinguish priority households for resettlement, such technical expressions 
of risk were not the only rationality at work in defining household eligibility. While 
‘rendered technical’ (Li, 2007) through the institutions, procedures and discourses 
of risk management institutions, in fact a political and bureaucratic ‘matrix’ was at 
work that in its structural origins went beyond the influence of the ‘everyday’ state-
citizen encounters that Ziederman describes as important to the definition of risk 
‘on the ground’ (Zeiderman, 2012). The political and bureaucratic logics at work in 
processes of risk definition stemmed from the historical origins of the programme, 
and reflected competing imperatives to both include and formalise informal 
populations as well as contain and structure the programme (Rothstein and 
Downer, 2012).   
The form that this took for households in high-risk landslide zones was a set of 
eligibility criteria first laid down in a municipal decree in 2003 (Decreto 094) and 
then in the procedures of implementing agencies. The decree limited entitlements 
to a new housing subsidy for resettled populations by establishing the ‘technical’ 
mode of prioritising families through risk assessment but also through 
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requirements to have a deed of sale or improvement; invoices from public service 
companies and judicial declarations by the Junta de Accion Communal (or locally 
elected committee); to have lived on the plot at the time of its declaration as a high 
risk zone; to not own another title and to have no other member of the family group 
in the resettlement programme (Decreto 94 2003). Further qualifying details were 
developed by implementing agencies: those in ownership or possession, for 
example, should have been so for at least five years and they should have cleared all 
debt with public service companies (State housing agency (Caja de Vivienda 
Popular) official – June 2010). Further, the guiding logic of the programme focussed 
on protecting the right to life - translating into the practical stipulation that the 
programme should apply only to persons physically ‘at risk’ at the time of a given 
emergency (DPAE official – January 2010). 
This rationality emerged out of a specific historical juncture in the ladera 
programme as well as the political context in Bogota at the time. Its enactment and 
use in the context of risk management finds parallels in the analysis of co-production     
in the field of medical risk, where Epstein shows how scientific and state policies 
and categories were essentially ‘hybridised’ to produce a form of health 
classification in the US which simultaneously served logics present in biomedicine, 
in lobbyists’ framing of their concerns and in the state administration itself (Epstein, 
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2009). In Bogota’s ladera programme a form of ‘structured containment’ by the state 
(Biehl, 2005) emerged which fused risk knowledge, political categorisation and a 
particular – and limited - conception of rights. This was driven by the tension for 
state agencies between regulating risk, the high financial costs of risk-related 
resettlement, and the thorny dilemma of wanting to dis-incentivise new and 
repeated settlement in risk zones (Local management team DPAE – January 2010; 
Former ladera programme coordinator – June 2010; Caja de Vivienda Popular 
official – January 2010; Former district planning official – January 2010). As outlined 
by officials working in risk management institutions at this time, by the second 
Mockus administration of 2001-2004, during which the Decreto was passed, the 
municipal government was financially over-burdened, while damage from ongoing 
landslides in Altos de Estancia accelerated from the start of 2002, along with the 
number of evacuations and projected resettlement needs (Former director social 
management team, DPAE – June 2010; Former DPAE official and director of 
resettlement – June 2010). 
Epstein shows how the co-production of US government health classification 
obscured questions about the nature and causes of health problems, by privileging 
biological difference over a view of health risk as related to structural categories 
(such as social class) and practices (such as certain types of social behaviour) 
(Epstein, 2009). In the three landslide risk zones of Bogota, the effect of eligibility 
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criteria was to engender a dynamic of social inclusion and exclusion that de-
privileged the risks faced by certain groups due to their social status or practices. 
Table 1 shows the influence of categorisation on the reasons cited by households in 
high risk zones for their failure to access the resettlement programme. 
“insert Table 1”     
Table 1: Reasons cited for exclusion or delay in accessing government 
resettlement programme from high risk zones 
Source: Author’s elaboration from fieldwork. 
Household interviews as well as secondary documentation showed up the salience 
of the length of settlement and ownership status to eligibility. Renters and squatters 
did not qualify because they were deemed able to take up residence in other areas 
of the city; newer settlers were ineligible because they were not present in the zones 
at the time of prior landslides, when censuses for resettlement were conducted, or 
because they were politically displaced and eligible for other housing subsidies 
(Caja de Vivienda Popular official – June 2010).  
The majority of people interviewed in all three zones, however, were home owners 
(holding a form of informal title albeit through illegal purchase) who were the 
original settlers of the neighbourhood, having arrived as part of the main wave of 
urbanisation of the zones from the 1990s and then undertaking a gradual process of 
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self-building. For home owners, despite the state’s acknowledgement of informal 
title, state assumptions about social practices in eligibility criteria were the most 
common factors preventing or delaying access to resettlement programmes. In 
particular, this included the practice of obtaining credit from public services 
companies for the purchase of domestic goods and patterns of ownership and 
habitation, such as living on a plot owned by an estranged or deceased family 
member (so that families had to go through a process of transferring ownership 
documents before they could be resettled), moving between urban and rural areas 
and the incremental practice of house building. The process governed the mitigation 
of risk exposure for those left living in risk zones but also affected household 
sensitivity to landslide risk: those who remained in high-risk zones were not entitled 
to state-provided service upgrading or to undertake building modifications, such as 
upgrading one’s house through the process of building a brick house to replace the 
original zinc sheet and wood constructions, which would also have protected 
against disaster damage and loss. 
To give one example, in the Altos de Estancia risk zone I interviewed an association 
of nearly 50 plot owners who were absent in person at the time of the census during 
a landslide emergency, or whose houses were at that time incomplete, and would 
therefore have been marked on the census as uninhabited. The families, however, 
remained or returned after the zone was cleared so as to, as one inhabitant 
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expressed it, ‘not lose possession of our plots’. They were living in some squalor in 
predominantly poor quality shacks of zinc and wood (as they only planned on 
temporary shelter while their situation was appraised) with few services, tapping 
electricity illegally and without any water or drainage service (Interviews March 
and June 2010). 
“insert Fig. 3 and 4”     
Fig. 3 New settler household in the Altos de Estancia high risk zone, classified 
as illegal and formally excluded from risk management programmes. 
Source: Author, 2010  
Fig. 4 Original settlers’ houses in the Altos de Estancia high risk zone.  
The owners, settled in the zone since the 1990s, needed to regularise the family’s land 
titles before admittance to the resettlement programme, and were negotiating for two 
new houses through the resettlement programme to accommodate all family 
members.  
Source: Author, 2010. 
State visions of citizenship in risk management and their effects  
Alongside the categorisation process, state visions about the passage to urban 
citizenship through resettlement also influenced patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
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in high risk zones. These values and discourses were rooted in the historical 
embeddedness of the programme in broader projects of urban improvement, with 
Mockus’ programmes focussed in particular on protecting life and security through 
the construction of new social behaviours and norms around citizenship while 
Penalosa focussed on physical infrastructure. Politically, risk-related resettlement 
became an opportunity for the state to reorder illegal zones, with the 2000 
territorial plan declaring as a strategy “the conversion of the resettlement of the 
population into an opportunity to push urban ordering and improve conditions of 
life in the sector” (p.55)(Decreto 619 2000). This movement from illegality to 
legality involved encouraging eligible families to take up new (state-build) housing 
rather than existing housing stock, and, if necessary, temporary rental 
accommodation. This was accompanied by the active promotion of ‘citizenship’ – 
those going into new social housing received training in ‘rights and duties’ – and a 
discourse of ‘co-responsibility’ for citizenship. As one housing agency official 
related, “Often people can’t pay for their papers [such as ownership documents], and 
you have to explain that they have to take some responsibility” (Caja de Vivienda 
Popular official – June 2010).  
However, home owners, even when eligible for resettlement, expressed deep 
ambivalence about the offer: while it reflected their desire for better housing and 
services it was also felt as a form of ‘identity risk’ (Wynne, 1996) as existing values 
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and ways of life were curtailed. In state-build houses, families could no longer keep 
animals and there was no longer space to accommodate large and extended families 
– they were commonly referred to by interviewees in the Altos de Estancia and 
Caracoli risk zones as ‘jaulas’ [cages]. Rental accommodation carried a stigma for the 
majority of home owners who had bought their lots in order to be able to move out 
of costly and insecure rental. In Brisas de Volador a family of sisters had returned to 
live on their parent’s plot after problems with rental payments explained, “It’s that 
if here they resettle you, then you go to your own house and live well, then you can 
work at least to have good food, education for the children, but you can’t if you are 
paying rent” (Interview January 2010). 
Household asset status also influenced responses to resettlement offers, and to a 
certain extent the profile of excluded households (although this was overlain with 
the exclusion of social groups of newer settlers, renters and squatters who were 
more asset poor, and the evacuation of areas of neighbourhoods following a 
landslide which cut across all groups)3. For longer-term medium to high-asset 
                                                          
3 To be eligible for resettlement, the household had to be in socio-economic bracket 1 or 2 (the lowest 
strata). This reflected quite wide internal variation, however, as indicated by differences in housing 
structure – from two storey brick constructions to zinc and wood makeshift shelters put up by new settlers 
and partially developed by poorer long-term settlers.  
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ranking households their ambivalence to resettlement also reflected the loss of the 
financial and emotional investment made in house-building, with compensation 
amounts cited as too low (although ‘high asset’ households (who more likely to have 
two storey brick houses, permanent employment, take loans and have strong 
political connections) were uncommon across the risk zones as they could pursue 
independent options to leave). As one high-asset home-owner commented: “those 
houses are no good for me, not even as a gift, they are good for displaced people 
(referring to poorer, newer settlers), for guerrillas (referring to those displaced from 
political conflict)” (Interview January 2010). Such responses to resettlement fed the 
refusal of some households to leave high risk zones, or prolonged their stay while 
they negotiated with risk management agencies (as reflected in Table 1).  
State responses to competing agendas: flexibility and the contradictions of the 
‘state’ in risk governance 
This final section shows how the ‘on-the-ground’ making of risk knowledge 
(Jasanoff, 2004) reflected the pragmatic responses of risk management agencies to 
the inherent political tensions in the ladera programme but also the unwitting 
contradictions between the mandates of different state institutions operating in risk 
zones (Duminy, 2011; Gupta, 2012).   
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Household interviews and the review of programmatic documentation revealed 
ongoing, ad-hoc and sporadic attempts by risk management agencies to accelerate 
the clearance of some households from risk zones, in a manner seemingly 
unconnected to their political or socioeconomic status. The group of home owners 
who re-occupied plots in the Altos de Estancia zone, pictured above, reported 
receiving offers of a ‘special subsidy’ to move on (Interviews  March and June 2010). 
In 2007, the DPAE had issued a new Technical Concept in Altos de Estancia that 
upped the technical priority for resettlement, including for 92 families who had built 
their houses after the census of 2003 and were therefore not formally eligible. The 
stated aim was of “saving life…and making the plots available for mitigation 
works…” (DPAE, 2007). In the Brisas de Volador risk zone, households in one area 
of the zone reported re-prioritisation in the resettlement process because state 
agencies wanted to undertake a re-forestation project (Interview August 2010). 
Again, the norms, principles and imperatives of the prevailing political context re-
shaped the application of risk assessment and re-defined the lived experience of risk 
for inhabitants. Continued habitation of risk zones was problematic for risk 
management agencies due to the politically-driven mandate of the programme to 
resettle people to protect them from risk and then ‘green’ cleared zones for 
recreation as part of wider urban improvement efforts. However, the desire to dis-
incentivise ongoing settlements in high risk zones led to the withdrawal of state 
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support from certain groups alongside attempts to harden control of (and 
criminalise) new settlements in high risk zones. Programme documents and 
municipal decrees related to the programme following the Decreto of 2003 embody 
this tension, with continuous changes to subsidy rates and eligibility criteria to 
prevent delay in entering resettlement programmes (Robles Joya, 2008; Caja de 
Vivienda Popular official – June 2010; Former director social management team, 
DPAE – June 2010) alongside decrees re-affirming that housing subsidies would not 
be available for those who settled on land after the declaration of the high risk zone 
(Decreto 40 2011). In this context, flexible techniques of accommodation with 
households and groups made it possible to move people on whilst avoiding 
enshrining and normalising new principles for inclusion. Whilst state mapping of 
risk boundaries and zones embodied a normative vision of how such landscapes 
should be governed, the physical basis of such maps allowed social relations and 
dynamics to remain visually unrepresented – and high risk zones ‘empty’ in the 
formal discourses of disaster management officials, despite the reported presence 
of around 30 groups in the Altos de Estancia high risk zone (Head, Altos de Estancia 
Social Management team, July 2010) – a dynamic of ‘un-mapping’ that allowed for 
such flexible play (Roy, 2009).  
The ongoing exposure of certain households and groups (with implications for their 
sensitivity to landslide risk) was influenced not only by the singular project of risk 
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management agencies, however, but by the actions of multiple state institutions 
working in risk zones. New occupancies occurred in all three zones where areas had 
been cleared through resettlement programme, facilitated both by the ongoing sale 
of land by local mafias and the enmeshment of local mayors in this politics (despite 
them being political appointees of the city mayor) which often prevented them from 
exercising their formally mandated role to evict people4. The delivery of services to 
high risk zones was governed by other state agencies and private companies. In the 
Caracoli risk zone, inhabitants of the high-risk area reported that the mode of water 
and drainage provision exacerbated erosion5. While a provisional water service (or 
communal tubes from a water tank left in place for households to connect to) was 
ensured by the (public run) water company on the basis that it had a duty to uphold 
people’s right to water, this did not extend to drainage. In conjunction, the state 
water agency had no mandate to repair community-constructed drainage (DPAE 
official – July 2010).  
                                                          
4 As one informant explained: “If they pull down houses, they may get death threats” (Disaster Risk 
Consultant, Ministry of Environment – January 2010). 
5 Technical risk assessments for the zone undertaken in 2006 also noted that ‘non-technical’ 
excavations – undertaken in the direction of the slope – aggravated erosion (DPAE, 2006). 
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Finally, the rights of settlers to remain in risk zones, or leave through resettlement 
programmes, were framed differently by different state agencies. Whereas risk 
management agencies were concerned to uphold the right to life, human rights and 
civil protection agencies supported broader constitutional rights to livelihoods and 
quality of life and, in one case of exclusion, the right to habeus data, or the 
constitutional right to be included in the relevant census (DPAE, 2009). Not all legal 
cases supported by these agencies were upheld in the courts, and not all households 
had the resources to seek their support (in the Caracoli neighbourhood, out of 
twenty two households surveyed, only three households reported directly 
contacting state agencies). However, individual cases did force inclusion into 
resettlement or the stay of evictions: for example, in one case in the Altos de Estancia 
risk zone, human rights agencies asked that newly displaced settlers arriving from 
rural conflict zones be allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds rather than 
being evicted (DPAE, 2009).  
The idiom of co-production provides a framework through which to interrogate and 
link the making of knowledge (through landslide risk assessments) and the making 
of government (through state practice in risk zones)(Jasanoff, 2004), beyond 
existing governmentality approaches to risk governance. Defining what risk is, who 
is at risk and how risks should be addressed has been an integral part of processes 
of formalisation and upgrading in Bogota’s informal settlements. Processes of risk 
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definition have embodied its conflicts in informal zones over individual and 
institutional responsibility, its politics of social and political categorisation and its 
norms and visions of who an urban citizen should be and how they should behave. 
The resulting form of risk knowledge has functioned in practice through modes of 
governance influenced by the context of informality, its complexity, indeterminacy 
and form of institutional multiplicity. The resulting forms of social inclusion and 
exclusion have influenced patterns of exposure and sensitivity in landslide risk 
zones – revealing a missing politics of vulnerability.     
The theoretical contribution of the work is illustrated by placing it in the context of 
other analytic readings of disaster risk and vulnerability from Bogota itself. From a 
social vulnerability perspective, authors emphasise how the risk management 
paradigm in Bogota has focussed on protection against ‘natural’ phenomena 
through physical mitigation measures, exposure reduction and risk communication 
but has little engaged with understanding or tackling the social vulnerability of 
affected communities, the social forces that propel the habitation of risk zones and 
the capacities of inhabitants to prepare for or recover from landslide impacts 
(Lampis and Rubiano, 2012; Hewitt, 1983). However, when this perspective is 
applied to social and historical analysis of the ladera programme, important 
questions remain about the political drivers of ongoing vulnerability in risk zones 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Pelling, 2003). Some of these dimensions of risk are captured 
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by work from a governmentality perspective which historicises the phenomena of 
the ‘high risk zone’, and shows how its boundaries are set not only in the hard 
science of probabilistic calculation but in highly contingent, personal encounters 
(Zeiderman, 2012). The sense of the political contingency of risk is echoed in the 
analysis developed here. However, unexplained in this post-structural account is the 
matrix of institutional rationalities at play, reflecting not only the technical 
endeavour of risk management but also the political commitments – and their 
tensions – embodied in risk definitions; not only the rationality of high-modernist 
planning but also the on the ground imbrication of state institutions in the 
construction of informality itself (Jasanoff, 2004; Roy, 2009; Gupta, 2012).  
Conclusion 
The importance of adapting to climate change and protecting against disaster risks 
in urban areas has been increasingly recognised by international and urban actors, 
but a major challenge remains to move forward from hazards-centric, technocratic 
approaches that dominate current responses (World Bank, 2011; Birkmann et al., 
2010; Wamsler and Brink, 2013). The call to address the social and structural 
drivers of urban risk comes from many perspectives; this article buttresses the 
appeal to address the political and institutional dimensions of such processes 
(Blaikie et al., 1994; Pelling, 2003; Mustafa, 2005; Rebotier, 2013). It also suggests, 
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however, that we need to better understand how risks are defined in urban risk 
governance in politically contingent ways (Forysth, 2003; Jasanoff, 2004) as well as 
how the context of informality influences how urban risk governance operates ‘on 
the ground’ (Stripple and Bulkeley, 2014; Roy, 2009). These considerations apply as 
much to moves to promote better multi-stakeholder governance in urban risk 
management (Birkmann et al., 2010) as they do to particular policy measures being 
advocated for urban adaptation planning, including resettlement, land use zoning 
and building control (World Bank, 2011). While improved deliberation, the natural 
corollary of an analysis of knowledge politics (Forsyth, 2003, Jasanoff, 2004), may 
be one part of the route forward, this may be an insufficient mechanism for change 
if the broader structural and developmental factors (and power relations) that 
shape people’s ability to deliberate remain unaddressed (Blaikie et al., 1994). 
Further combining insights from critical social and political and planning theory and 
science and technology studies in the context of urban vulnerability, however, may 
help to illuminate a more progressive agenda.    
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